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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

-

FIRST

AMENDMENT

FREEDOM OF SPEECH -.STATUTE PROHIBITING "LOUD
AND UNSEEMLY" NOISES IS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL
REGULATION OF PROTECTED SPEECH. Eanes v. State,
318 Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604 (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3218 (1990).

Assume for the moment that it is 1965 and Jerry Wayne Eanes
is a civil rights advocate. At midday he gives a loud speech on a
sidewalk in downtown Hagerstown, an area that contains both homes
and businesses. After receiving some complaints about the noise from
residents and workers, the police warn Eanes that he is too loud.
Eanes refuses to end his speech and is arrested and convicted for
violating a broadly written statute that prohibits "loud and unseemly
noises." Would the Court of Appeals of Maryland have upheld the
conviction under a first amendment challenge? Surprisingly, from
what the court hints in Eanes v. State,' it might have.
The above scenario is exactly what occurred in Eanes, except
the date and subject of the speech were different. The actual date
was 1988, and Eanes was speaking out against abortion in front of
an abortion clinic. The court held that the breach of the peace statute
under which Eanes was convicted is a content-neutral regulation of
speech, meaning it regulates how a speech can be given, not what
can be said in that speech. 2 A reading of the Eanes decision, however,
leaves one with the lingering impression that it may have been
precisely the content of Eanes' speech that led the court to find that
the statute was "content-neutral."
The statute at issue in Eanes was section 121 of Article 27 of
the Maryland Annotated Code, which makes it unlawful for anyone
to "wilfully disturb any neighborhood in [any Maryland] city, town
or county by loud and unseemly noises." 3 In Diehl v. State4 the
court construed "loud and unseemly noise" to be conduct such as
advocating imminent lawless action and inciting a breach of the
1. 318 Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990).

2. Id. at 448-49, 569 A.2d at 609-10.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1987) [hereinafter section 121].
4. 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).
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peace.' Diehl involved a police officer who was confronted by a
belligerent passenger after stopping a car for a traffic violation. 6 The
passenger exited the car and screamed obscenities at the officer, who
twice asked the passenger to return to the car. 7 When the passenger
refused the second time, the officer arrested him for violating section
121. 8 In reversing the conviction, the court concluded that Diehl's
speech did not qualify as loud and unseemly noise under section 121,
and could not permissibly be regulated because it did not advocate
lawless action or incite a breach of the peace. 9 As a result of this
decision, the court limited the ability of section 121 to regulate the
content of speech. The question of whether section 121 could also
act as a content-neutral regulation of the volume of speech, however,
was left open.
Such a regulation is constitutional only if it can be shown that
the challenged statute or regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' 0 A state may
enforce regulations affecting the time, place and manner of expression
if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. "1
In a series of cases involving state regulation of the manner of
expression, the Supreme Court found that states have a significant
interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome noise. In Saia v. New
York, 2 the Court found unconstitutional a penal ordinance that
forbade the use of sound amplification devices without the permission
of the chief of police. The Court reasoned that, because sound
amplification devices are indispensable to effective public speaking,
any abuses created by such devices could only be controlled by
narrowly drawn statutes. 4 The statute in Saia created a potential for
abuse because it provided the chief of police with too much discretion. "

5. Id.at 472, 451 A.2d at 119.
6.Id.at 468, 451 A.2d at 116.
7. Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 117.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 472, 451 A.2d at 119.
10. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
11. Id. at 45. Recently, the Court reiterated that the government's interest must
be significant. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
However, in deciding that the government's interest in Ward was valid, the
Court called the interest substantial. Id. at 796. Apparently, "significant" and
"substantial" are synonymous for this analysis.
12. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
13. Id. at 559-60.
14. Id.at 562.
15. Id. at 560.
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About a year later in Kovacs v. Cooper, 6 the Court upheld a
city ordinance that prohibited the use of sound trucks that emitted
"loud and raucous" noise. 7 Concerned with protecting the unwilling
listeners in residential areas, the Court reasoned that, without government regulation, the quiet tranquility of residential areas would
be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or political
persuasions.'"
More recently in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 9 the Court
upheld a regulation giving New York City broad authority to control
the volume level at concerts at a Central Park bandshell.20 The
regulation required performers to use sound-amplification equipment
and a sound technician provided by the city. 2' The Court upheld the
regulation because it was "narrowly tailored to serve the substantial
and content-neutral government interest of avoiding excessive sound
volume and providing sufficient amplification within the bandshell
concert ground, and the guideline leaves open ample channels of
communication. "22 The unifying aspect of these cases is that they
involved the regulation of amplified sound. In situations involving
unamplified speech, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to uphold
broad regulations.
For example, in Edwards v. South Carolina,23 187 protesters
against racial discrimination demonstrated near the South Carolina
state house and were arrested after being warned by police that their
loud and boisterous conduct was disturbing the peace. 24 The demonstrators sang, clapped and stomped their feet. 25 The Court overturned their convictions after finding that the convictions did not
result "from the evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly
drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain
specific conduct be limited or proscribed. ' 26
Two years later in Cox v. Louisiana,27 the Court overturned the
similar conviction of a civil rights leader for disturbing the peace. 2
16.
17.
18.
19.

336 U.S. 77 (1949).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 87.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).

20. Id. at 803. The Court made it clear that the narrow tailoring requirement does
not mean the regulation must achieve its goal through the least restrictive
means. Id. at 798. The only requirement is that the regulation not be substantially broader than necessary to achieve the state's desired interest. Id. at 802.
21. Id. at 784.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 803.
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
Id. at 229-33.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 236.
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Id. at 537-38.
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The leader organized a demonstration involving 2,000 students marching on downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 29 The students sang,
cheered and prayed, but were dispersed with tear gas after the leader
urged them to conduct a sit-in at stores that would not serve meals
to blacks.30 Comparing the case to Edwards, the Court found "the
record does not support the contention that the students' cheering,
clapping and singing constitutes a breach of the peace."'"
Standing in apparent contrast to these civil rights protest decisions is Grayned v. Rockford, 2 in which the Supreme Court upheld
an Illinois anti-noise ordinance forbidding people on grounds adjacent
to school buildings from creating noises or disturbances that disturbed
classes.33 Grayned is distinguishable from Edwards and Cox, however,
because the statute in Grayned was narrowly tailored, not broadly
written to prevent any activity that could be construed as a "breach
of the peace." As the court emphasized, the ordinance in Grayned
was limited to grounds adjacent to school buildings, times when
schools are in session and only when
the noise interfered with the
34
peace and good order of the school.
These Supreme Court decisions indicate a tolerance for the
regulation of amplified speech if necessary to protect the public from
noise. But the Court does not seem to be as tolerant of the regulation
of unamplified speech, especially in situations in which broadly
written statutes are used by police to silence demonstrators. Nevertheless, there remains enough uncertainty in these decisions that state
courts interpreting them have come to mixed conclusions when deciding the constitutionality of statutes aimed at those who make loud
or unusual noise.
The Supreme Court of California held that a conviction for
making "loud or unusual" noise is constitutional only when the
speech causes a "clear and present danger of violence or when the
communication is not intended as such but is merely a guise to
disturb persons." 3 5 The California statute at issue provided that
"[eJvery person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or
quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise ...
is guilty of a misdemeanor." '3 6 While recognizing that content-neutral
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 540.
Id. at 542-44.
Id. at 549.
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Id. at 106.
Id. at 111-12.
In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 618-19, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465,
469 (1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 950 (1974); see also People v.
Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 420, 573 P.2d 100, 104 (1978) (en banc); State v.
Marker, 21 Or. App. 671, 678, 536 P.2d 1273, 1277 (1975).
36. In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d at 616, 510 P.2d at 1019, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
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limitations on protected speech are permissible, the court concluded
that the statute did not constitute a permissible limitation under the
first amendment because its scope was too broad."
A similar New Jersey ordinance prohibiting "unreasonably loud
and unnecessary noise" was upheld because "[w]hether a given noise
disturbs the public peace depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and it is impractical to spell out rigid legislative
criteria." 3 Similarly, a Pennsylvania statute was found to constitutionally prohibit disorderly conduct caused by "loud, boisterous and
unseemly" noise because a narrowing judicial interpretation limited
it to unprotected speech, 3 9 and a Seattle disorderly conduct ordinance
prohibiting "loud or raucous" behavior that "unreasonably disturbs
others" was found not vague because it applied only to activity
within a bus. 4° As a result of the Eanes decision, Maryland has
joined Pennsylvania in upholding the constitutionality of a broadly
written anti-noise statute without time, place or manner restrictions.
The Eanes case began on May 18, 1988 when Jerry Wayne Eanes
took part in an anti-abortion demonstration in front of the Hagerstown Reproductive Clinic located on West Washington Street, "a
congested, one-way, two-lane thoroughfare in Hagerstown."141 Between 10:30 a.m. and noon, Eanes and another man periodically
preached loudly, without any artificial amplification, the "gospel of
Jesus Christ." 42 After receiving complaints from residents and people
working in the area, police requested that Eanes reduce the volume

37. See id. at 620, 510 P.2d at 1022, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 470 (citing Cohen v.

38.

39.
40.

41.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (section 415 "would not inform the ordinary
person that distinctions between localities were created")).
State v. Holland, 132 N.J. Super. 17, 23, 331 A.2d 626, 629 (1975) (per
curiam); see also State v. Johnson, 112 Ariz. 383, 542 P.2d 808 (1975) (en
banc) (statute which made it a misdemeanor to "maliciously and willfully
disturb[] the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person by... [lioud
or unusual noise" is not overbroad); Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass.
491, 269 N.E.2d 657 (1971) ("disturbers of the peace" is not vague).
Commonwealth v. Weiner, 230 Pa. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 896 (1974).
City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash. 2d 22, 759 P.2d 366 (1988) (en banc); see
also Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 1980) (prohibition of
unreasonably loud, raucous, jarring, or disturbing sound limited to certain
times and places); State v. Smith, 46 N.J. 510, 218 A.2d 147, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 838 (1966) (statute proscribing "noisy or disorderly" conduct limited
to places of assembly, including schools, churches, libraries, and reading
rooms).
318 Md. 436, 441, 569 A.2d 604, 606, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990). The
clinic shares a building with two other businesses. Id. There is also at least
one residential apartment in the building, and there is a residential apartment
building across the street. Id.

42. Id. Eanes did not engage in any other activity such as blocking access to the
clinic or inciting his listeners to violence. Id. at 441 n.2, 569 A.2d at 606 n.2.
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of his speech. Eanes continued and was arrested shortly thereafter."
On August 2, 1988, the District Court of Maryland for Washington County convicted Eanes of violating section 121 . 41 On de
novo review, the Circuit Court for Washington County also found
Eanes guilty.46
In affirming47 Eanes' conviction, the court of appeals began its
analysis by determining that section 121 is a content-neutral regulation
of the manner of speech . 4 s The court found that "loud" refers to a
high volume level of speech and that "unseemly" "requires
the
'49
circumstances."
the
by
informed
be
to
'loud'
of
meaning
Since the court found that section 121 regulates only the manner,
not the content, of speech, the statute would pass constitutional
muster if it were also found to be narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial government interest and if it provided alternative means
of communication. 0 The court found a substantial government interest in protecting captive audiences - unwilling listeners or viewers
who cannot readily escape from the undesired communication from noise.5 ' Then, noting that a regulation is narrowly tailored if
it promotes a government interest that would be achieved less effectively without the regulation, the court determined that "[s]ince the
character of open public places may differ widely ....
only a flexible
approach to volume control can adequately serve the myriad circumstances which the State can legitimately regulate. ' 5 2 The court concluded that section 121 carries out such an approach to volume
control because the particular circumstances in question define what
is "loud and unseemly" speech." Finally, the court found that the

43. Id. at 441-42, 569 A.2d at 606. In addition, the administrator of the clinic
and at least one resident complained directly to Eanes. Id. at 441, 569 A.2d
at 606.
44. Id. at 442, 569 A.2d at 606.
45. Id. at 442, 569 A.2d at 607.
46. Id. at 442-43, 569 A.2d at 607.
47. Judge Adkins wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Judge
Murphy and Judges Rodowsky and McAuliffe. See id. at 436, 440, 569 A.2d
at 604-06. Judge Eldridge wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Judges
Cole and Blackwell. Id. at 436, 569 A.2d at 604.
48. Id. at 448-49, 569 A.2d at 609-10. Section 121 does not regulate the time or
place of speech. Id. at 449, 569 A.2d at 610.
49. Id. at 448-49, 569 A.2d at 610.
50. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
51. Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 449, 569 A.2d 604, 610, cert. denied, 496 U.S.
938 (1990).
52. Id. at 454, 569 A.2d at 613.
53. Id. In a commercial district, one may speak at a higher volume during business
hours than at midnight. Id. at 455, 569 A.2d at 613. In a quieter environment,
such as a residential neighborhood, the prohibited volume level becomes lower.
Id.
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statute permits alternative avenues of communication, because it
would allow other forms of communication, such
as addressing
54
passersby, distributing literature, or carrying a sign.
Even though the court had found that section 121 was content
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and that it did not inhibit the use of alternative channels of communication, the statute could still be found to violate the first
amendment if its words "loud and unseemly noise" rendered it vague
or overbroad." Dealing with the possibility of vagueness first, the
court held that section 121 is not impermissibly vague because the
common understanding of the words "loud and unseemly" give
sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited.5 6 The court conceded,
however, that "a speaker exercising the legitimate rights of free
speech may be unaware that his or her volume has reached a
prohibitive level and has become unlawfully disruptive." 5 7 To remedy
this problem of fair notice, the court found that the application of
section 121 requires a prior warning from the police. 8 Also, as a
precaution against oppressive action by government, the court held
that the police may act under this statute only after receiving a
complaint giving them a reasonable belief that the speaker has
59
violated section 121.
The court did not give as much attention to the possibility that
the statute was overbroad. 60 An overbroad statute prohibits conduct
that may not be punished under the first and fourteenth amendments. 61 The danger is that such a statute will have a chilling effect
on free expression. 62 The court found no such danger exists with
section 121 because it "is neither without applicable enforcement
standards nor can it be permissibly applied when the objection to
speech is solely based on its content. ' 63 If section 121 is properly

54. Id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 614-15. If the intent is to reach area residents or
merchants, a speaker can reach them through the mail, by telephone, or in
person. Id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 615.
55. Id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 615.
56. Id. at 461, 569 A.2d at 616. The court cited several cases from other states
which held that statutes similar to section 121 were not vague. Id. at 462-63,
569 A.2d at 617; see also infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a brief
discussion of these cases.
57. Eanes, 318 Md. at 463, 569 A.2d at 617.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 464, 569 A.2d at 617-18.
60. See id. at 464, 569 A.2d at 618. The court stated, "We need not dwell long
on Eanes's claim that § 121 is overbroad." Id.
61. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972).
62. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-98
(1984).
63. Eanes. 318 Md. at 465. 569 A.2d at 618.
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applied, the court stated, it "reaches only that conduct which can
be regulated consistent with the rights of free speech and does not
reach beyond." 64
Finally, after rejecting all facial challenges to section 121,6 the
court still had to consider whether section 121 was constitutional as
applied to Eanes. Relying on the analysis of the circuit court judge,
the court of appeals held that the noise created by Eanes was
"unreasonably loud under the circumstances" and that "Eanes was
warned to lower his voice by a police officer whose action was based
on complaints from members of the captive audience." As a result,
the court concluded that he was properly convicted under section

121 .67
On a theoretical level, the Eanes decision makes sense. The court
has construed section 121 as a content-neutral regulation of speech.
The statute can only be invoked to suppress speech when a citizen
complains about a speaker's noise and the police have given that
6
speaker a warning.
On a pragmatic level, however, the Eanes decision creates a
danger to freedom of expression. The judicially imposed elements
requiring a prior police warning and a citizen complaint give complainants and police a powerful weapon for suppressing speech. Either
the police or a citizen, acting under the guise that a speaker is too
loud, could silence a speaker because they do not like the speaker
or agree with what the speaker is saying. 69 This might have been
exactly what happened in Eanes.
The majority opinion relied heavily on Ward, Saia and Kovacs
to support its theme that the government has an interest in protecting
its citizens from unwelcome noise. While it is true that those cases
permit the regulation of sound, they also contain a common thread
that the majority fails to consider - sound amplification. 70 Ward
involved the amplification of sound in a Central Park bandshell, 71
Saia involved the amplification of lectures in a public park 72 and
Kovacs involved the use of a sound truck to broadcast music and to
comment on a labor dispute. 73 Even though the Kovacs opinion
64. Id.
65. The content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner of speech, vagueness,
and overbreadth analyses all focused on the language of the statute rather than
on how it was applied to Eanes.
66. Eanes, 318 Md. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
69. Eanes, 318 Md. at 477, 569 A.2d at 624 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 478, 569 A.2d at 625 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
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mentions that a distinction should be made between the regulation
of amplified sound and unamplified speech, 74 the court of appeals
failed to consider this distinction. Instead, the majority drew the
dubious conclusion that the broad regulation of any unamplified
sound is permissible, despite it being clear that there "is a constitutionally significant difference between" amplified sound and unamplified speech.75
In addition to ignoring this difference, the majority also placed
too much emphasis on the Grayned decision to support its concern
for the well-being of a captive audience. While the Supreme Court
did uphold the anti-noise ordinance in Grayned, that ordinance is
not analogous to the one under consideration in Eanes. The ordinance
in Grayned was limited to grounds adjacent to a school building and
to times when school was in session; it was also construed to prohibit
76
noise that interfered with the peace and good order of the school.
The broadly written anti-noise ordinance in Eanes is more analogous to the disturbing the peace statutes in Edwards and Cox. These
cases undermine the proposition that mere loudness, accompanied by
complaints and warnings, is sufficient to justify the suppression of
unamplified political speech. 77 The actions of the demonstrators in
Edwards and Cox were certainly more disruptive than Eanes' speech.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the demonstrators' behavior was probably disruptive, stated that the purpose
of free speech is to invite dispute, which is often best accomplished
when speech "induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
' 78
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
The majority in Eanes evidently dismissed the importance of
inviting dispute, possibly because Eanes was not as sympathetic a
defendant as the civil rights demonstrators in Edwards and Cox.
Eanes was speaking against abortion, an unfavored position in a
state that has enacted laws to protect a woman's right to an abortion. 79 The defendants in Edwards and Cox were promoting civil
74. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The Court stated, "There is no
restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the
human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers." Id. at 89.
75. Eanes, 318 Md. at 482, 569 A.2d at 627 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
78. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (quoting Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
551-52 (1965) (also quoting Terminiello at 4-5).
79. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-209 (Supp. 1992) (essentially codifying
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which granted women the right to an
abortion). Although this statute, which survived a November 1992 referendum,
was not passed by the Maryland General Assembly until after the court of
appeals decided Eanes, it is evidence of the popular support for the pro-choice
movement in Maryland.
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rights, a favored movement in the 1960s that was often aided by the
Supreme Court.
As a result of its reliance on Grayned and its overlooking of
Edwards and Cox, the majority opinion gave too much weight to
the rights of a captive audience at the expense of the first amendment
right of free speech. The dissent pointed out that "Eanes was
expressing his opposition to abortion, one of the most controversial
political and social issues today." 80 Furthermore, by speaking on a
public sidewalk in a commercial district of Hagerstown late on a
Tuesday morning, "Eanes preached his anti-abortion message in the
most appropriate place and at the most appropriate time." 8' Some
people live in commercial areas and some people sleep during the
day, but if "constitutionally protected speech is limited to that not
objected to by such persons, the scope8 2 of the First Amendment's
free speech clause is extremely narrow.

1

The problems with the Eanes decision do not end with the
majority's treatment of the first amendment. In attempting to cure
vagueness problems in section 121, the majority added the prerequisites of a complaint and police warning. These new elements still
do not save section 121 from vagueness. Their effect is to put the
decision of whether speech is "loud and unseemly" into the hands
of the police. 3 Upon reading the statute, therefore, people still cannot
determine if their speech will be regulated or not; they must rely on
police discretion. This makes the enforcement of section 121 arbitrary. As the dissent explained, "if two speakers, at about the same
time of day and in similar neighborhoods, reach the same volume,
and persons complain only about one of them, a police officer can
use § 121 only against the speaker who was the object of the
complaints.' '84
One final reason, as the dissent noted, that Eanes' conviction
should have been reversed is because the application of a new
interpretation of section 121 violated his due process rights. 81 On the
day before the speech that was the subject of the court of appeals'
decision, the Circuit Court for Washington County had acquitted

80. Eanes, 318 Md. at 472, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).

81. Id. at 473, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 474, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
83. Upon receiving a complaint, a police officer may act pursuant to § 121 if the
officer reasonably believes that the speaker has violated the statute. Eanes, 318
Md. at 464, 569 A.2d at 617-18.
84. Eanes, 318 Md. at 490, 569 A.2d at 631 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 495-500, 569 A.2d at 633-35 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Although the Ex
Post Facto clauses apply only to legislative acts, "a similar limitation applies
to judicial action through the operation of the Due Process clauses." Id. at
495, 569 A.2d at 633 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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Eanes for engaging in identical activity.8 6 The state had prosecuted
Eanes under section 122, which also prohibits "loud and unseemly"
noises. 7 Because the circuit court had just held that Eanes' prior
conduct was not "loud and unseemly," he was justified in ignoring
the police warning to lower his voice.
Nevertheless, the court upheld Eanes' conviction, and as a result
expanded the scope of section 121. In Diehl, section 121 had been
used only to regulate unprotected speech."8 Now protected speech is
also subject to the limitations of section 121. Of the two new elements
to section 121 - a prior citizen complaint and a police warning the requirement of a police warning is likely to have the largest
impact. As long as one citizen complains, police will now have the
power to end almost any public speech in any traditional public
forum whenever they desire.
Rather than changing the statute in an attempt to make Eanes'
conduct unlawful, the court should have reversed his conviction. This
would have sent a message to the legislature to create a more specific
statute. Assuming that Eanes had disrupted the operation of the
clinic, his speech could have been regulated by a statute prohibiting
noise that disrupts the operation of a medical facility.
In the context of the abortion debate, Eanes is a victory for
those supporting abortion rights. Previously, police could only stop
protesters at clinics if they engaged in unprotected speech, such as
blocking access to a clinic or inciting listeners to violence.A9 As a
result of Eanes, anti-abortion activists, fearing police action, might
be limited to less visible and effective means of protest, such as
carrying signs and distributing literature. The Eanes decision, therefore, stands as a threat to free speech.
Richard E. Guida

86. Id. at 469-70, 569 A.2d at 620 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The majority neglected

to mention this fact.

87. Id. at 469, 569 A.2d at 620 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Section 122 established
criminal penalties for "[a]ny person ... who shall wilfully act in a disorderly
manner by making loud and unseemly noises ... on or about any public

place."

MD.

ANN.

CODE

art. 27, § 122 (1987). The "loud and unseemly"

proscription in § 121 applies to neighborhoods, and in § 122 it applies to
public places.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9.

89. See, e.g.,

MD.

ANN.

CODE

art. 27, § 577B (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting

"[ilnterference with access to or egress from a medical facility").

